"- Prof. Jonez©"
2005-03-31 18:56:14 UTC
Report Says U.S. Intelligence 'Dead Wrong' on Iraq
Thu Mar 31, 2005 10:42 AM ET
By Steve Holland and Adam Entous
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. intelligence on Iraq was "dead
wrong," dealing a blow to American credibility that will
take years to undo, and spymasters still know disturbingly little
about nuclear programs in countries like Iran and North
Korea, a presidential commission reported on Thursday.
The commission's bluntly written report, based on more than
a year of investigations, offered a damning assessment of the
intelligence that President Bush used to launch the Iraq war
two years ago and warned that flaws are still all too common
throughout spy agencies. "We conclude that the intelligence
community was dead wrong in
almost all of its prewar judgments about Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction," the commissioners wrote.
And at a time when the United States is accusing Iran of
nuclear ambitions and pressuring North Korea on its nuclear
programs, the report said: "Across the board, the
intelligence community knows disturbingly little about the
nuclear programs of many of the world's most dangerous actors."
The presidential commission, led by appeals court judge
Laurence Silberman and former Virginia Republican Sen.
Charles Robb, called for a broad overhaul in the spy
community to increase
information-sharing and foster dissenting views.
"The flaws we found in the intelligence community's Iraq
performance are still all too common," they wrote.
White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the president
agreed the intelligence community needs fundamental change.
He said its recommendations would be reviewed and acted on
"in a fairly quick period of time."
A key chapter in the report -- on U.S. intelligence on
alleged nuclear weapons programs in Iran and North Korea --
was classified and not released publicly.
But sources familiar with that section said it was among the
most critical, finding U.S. intelligence on Iran's nuclear
program in particular to be inadequate.
The White House has acknowledged intelligence shortcomings
-- national security adviser Stephen Hadley called data on
Iran "hard to come by" -- but the administration has made
clear it stands by its policy of preemption.
A senior administration official said "there has been no
change in our policy to confront threats before they have
the opportunity to strike the homeland."
IRAQ INTELLIGENCE 'WORTHLESS OR MISLEADING'
The 600-page report sharply criticized the
intelligence-gathering on Iraq by the CIA, Defense
Intelligence Agency and other
agencies for producing "worthless or misleading"
intelligence before a war fought over claims that Saddam Hussein
possessed weapons of mass destruction, none of which was found.
In what amounted to a direct assault on George Tenet, who
was CIA director in the run-up to the Iraq war and gave the
president his daily intelligence briefing, the commission
found that "the
daily reports sent to the president and senior policymakers
discussing Iraq over many months proved to be disastrously
one-sided." Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, accused of
hyping the intelligence on Iraq in order to pursue a costly
war with a deadly aftermath, escaped direct blame.
"The analysts who worked Iraqi weapons issues universally
agreed that in no instance did political pressure cause
them to skew or alter any of their analytical judgments,"
the report said. But it added: "It is hard to deny the conclusion
that
intelligence analysts worked in an environment that did not
encourage skepticism about the conventional wisdom."
CHANGES NECESSARY
Thu Mar 31, 2005 10:42 AM ET
By Steve Holland and Adam Entous
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. intelligence on Iraq was "dead
wrong," dealing a blow to American credibility that will
take years to undo, and spymasters still know disturbingly little
about nuclear programs in countries like Iran and North
Korea, a presidential commission reported on Thursday.
The commission's bluntly written report, based on more than
a year of investigations, offered a damning assessment of the
intelligence that President Bush used to launch the Iraq war
two years ago and warned that flaws are still all too common
throughout spy agencies. "We conclude that the intelligence
community was dead wrong in
almost all of its prewar judgments about Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction," the commissioners wrote.
And at a time when the United States is accusing Iran of
nuclear ambitions and pressuring North Korea on its nuclear
programs, the report said: "Across the board, the
intelligence community knows disturbingly little about the
nuclear programs of many of the world's most dangerous actors."
The presidential commission, led by appeals court judge
Laurence Silberman and former Virginia Republican Sen.
Charles Robb, called for a broad overhaul in the spy
community to increase
information-sharing and foster dissenting views.
"The flaws we found in the intelligence community's Iraq
performance are still all too common," they wrote.
White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the president
agreed the intelligence community needs fundamental change.
He said its recommendations would be reviewed and acted on
"in a fairly quick period of time."
A key chapter in the report -- on U.S. intelligence on
alleged nuclear weapons programs in Iran and North Korea --
was classified and not released publicly.
But sources familiar with that section said it was among the
most critical, finding U.S. intelligence on Iran's nuclear
program in particular to be inadequate.
The White House has acknowledged intelligence shortcomings
-- national security adviser Stephen Hadley called data on
Iran "hard to come by" -- but the administration has made
clear it stands by its policy of preemption.
A senior administration official said "there has been no
change in our policy to confront threats before they have
the opportunity to strike the homeland."
IRAQ INTELLIGENCE 'WORTHLESS OR MISLEADING'
The 600-page report sharply criticized the
intelligence-gathering on Iraq by the CIA, Defense
Intelligence Agency and other
agencies for producing "worthless or misleading"
intelligence before a war fought over claims that Saddam Hussein
possessed weapons of mass destruction, none of which was found.
In what amounted to a direct assault on George Tenet, who
was CIA director in the run-up to the Iraq war and gave the
president his daily intelligence briefing, the commission
found that "the
daily reports sent to the president and senior policymakers
discussing Iraq over many months proved to be disastrously
one-sided." Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, accused of
hyping the intelligence on Iraq in order to pursue a costly
war with a deadly aftermath, escaped direct blame.
"The analysts who worked Iraqi weapons issues universally
agreed that in no instance did political pressure cause
them to skew or alter any of their analytical judgments,"
the report said. But it added: "It is hard to deny the conclusion
that
intelligence analysts worked in an environment that did not
encourage skepticism about the conventional wisdom."
CHANGES NECESSARY